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GPS & Galileo: Prospects for Building the Next Generation of Global Navigation
Satellite Systems

Glen Gibbons, Jr.

Abstract
In the next 5 to 10 years, the world will experience the emergence of a true Global
Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) - a compatible and, in many respects, interoperable
system of systems. The U.S. Global Positioning System, Europe's Galileo, perhaps
Russia's Glonass system, and regional augmentations including the Wide Area
Augmentation System (WAAS), the European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service
(EGNOS), radiobeacon-based systems such as the U.S. Nationwide Differential GPS, and
compatible commercial differential correction services will comprise this multifaceted
GNSS. Common signal structures and frequency plans will enable combined user
equipment that reduces the technical complexity and cost, while vastly expanding
related applications. Additional satellites and signals, both more powerful and with
improved designs, will increase the availability of robust signal reception outdoors and
strengthen the potential of indoor positioning using only GNSS user equipment. But the
path to the future is not without its risks: political, technical, economic, and cultural.

After nearly a decade of distrust and bickering, Europe and the United States are
showing signs of real harmony in the matter of global navigation satellite systems.
Last June, the two powers signed an agreement that lays the foundation for
substantive cooperation on GPS and Galileo - not merely in system compatibility
and interoperability, but also in matters of trade and security.
In certain respects, one can imagine no more unlike enterprises than the U.S.
Global Positioning System and Europe's Galileo system. GPS is operated by the
U.S. military establishment as a public entity; Galileo will be managed by a
private consortium as a public-private enterprise fully under civil control. GPS
uses one time standard; Galileo, another. The geodetic coordinate frameworks are
different. Not all the frequencies match up and signal designs will vary. GPS is
operated as a national system; Galileo is multinational - encompassing not merely
the 25 nations joined in the European Union, but also the People's Republic of
China, Israel, India, and a half dozen or more other nations with whom the EU has
been talking. GPS delivers signals in space for free; Galileo proposes to deliver
certifiable, guaranteed fee-based services in addition to a free open-access signal.
And then, of course, there's the most obvious difference: GPS is a real, existing
system with 29 satellites in orbit and tens of millions of users around the world.
Galileo is a work in progress. Galileo is a developmental program with a couple
of billion euros in its pocket, some leased channels on telecommunication
satellites to support the European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service
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(EGNOS), a bunch of components not yet assembled into the first Galileo
spacecraft (out of 30 planned for a full constellation), and a patchwork of ground
infrastructure. GPS has been fully operational for 10 years. Galileo's original
completion date, originally planned for 2008, may actually arrive even later.
Despite these substantial design differences, the two GNSS systems are basically
variations on a common technological theme. Over the long run, the political,
institutional, and commercial realm is where interoperability may meet its greatest
challenge. Technical experts will continually fine-tune frequency plans and signal
structures. Equipment manufacturers will come up with ever-better products
based on those designs. Service providers and end users will apply them in
unpredictable and imaginative ways. But everywhere, these efforts will be
facilitated - or constrained - by the business models, the rules adopted on
intellectual property rights, tax policies, security arrangements, carriage
requirements and regulatory policy, control and management of the space and
ground infrastructures, international participation in the GNSS programs, and so
forth.
Ironically, GPS and Galileo have inhabited a looking-glass world in which the
two sides were sometimes as divided by their similarities as they were united by
their differences. The experience with dueling GNSSes has demonstrated a
similar principle of contrary dynamics. Never were the two sides so far apart as
when Europeans first wanted to put themselves into the same GPS control room
as the Americans and, later, when they wanted to put certain Galileo signals on
some of the same frequencies as certain GPS signals.
Back in the mid-1990s, a delegation of officials from Brussels came to
Washington, D.C., to discuss the idea of European participation in the
management and operation of GPS. The Europeans said they'd even be willing to
help pay for the operation and modernization of the American system.
The first thing the Americans asked was Who are you and whom do you
represent? The European Union? France? Germany? Italy? Brussels? Our NATO
allies? The European Commission? The European Space Agency? Who are we
talking to? And the next thing the Americans said was, we don't need your money
and we don't want it if it means we have to give up an iota of control over a key
national infrastructure. And besides, you haven't actually allocated any money for
GNSS, no serious money, anyway; just some study funds.
Well, the Europeans went off and set about answering those questions and, in the
meantime, came up with a GNSS of their own - Galileo. Along the way, they also
created another practical example of how to go about building a political union.
Nothing sorts out the rhetoric from the real stuff as having to build a tangible
system and service. After the Airbus project and implementation of the euro
currency, Galileo already stands as a notable example of successful common
effort by the European Union. At least, so far.
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Anyway, after a few years, the European Commission came back to the United
States once again and said, okay, let's talk about GNSS now. And, because the EU
appeared to have its diplomatic act together, the United States set up an
interagency working group, led by the State Department, to meet with the
Europeans. Nonetheless, for the next couple of years, the two sides seemed to be
talking past each other, not to each other: the Europeans wanted to talk about
specific details of the technical designs of the systems. The United States insisted
on first discussing more general matters such as trade policy and regulatory issues
first. This went on until two things happened: first, the EU made a firm
commitment of funding to build Galileo. And, second, the Europeans went ahead
and came up with a provisional Galileo signal design on their own. Now, what got
the United States' attention was a part of the proposed Galileo design that would
have overlaid the publicly regulated service (PRS), an encrypted security-oriented
signal, on top of part of the new GPS military signal (M-code) planned for the L1
band.
Once again, a seeming common ground - use of the same radio frequency became a point of contention. U.S. defense officials argued strongly that the PRS
overlay would undermine GPS operators' ability to jam non-military signals in a
theater of operations without interfering with the M-code. At that point, the two
sides began talking about all of the issues at once. They set up technical working
groups - which sometimes met under secret classified conditions -- to come up
with mutually workable solutions. The United States even went so far as to
propose that GPS would use a similar signal structure as Galileo - the binary
offset carrier (BOC) - if the EU would agree to a narrower frequency plan that
moved the PRS away from the M-code.
In effect, a change in political reality - the fact that Galileo would be built whether
or not the U.S. government wanted that to occur - precipitated a change in U.S.
technology policy. So, in Washington, D.C., the question was no longer how to
keep GPS as the only fully operational GNSS. The question for the United States
became how to ensure that the systems were secure, compatible, and
interoperable. By compatible, I mean that the systems do not interfere with each
other. Interoperable refers to the synergistic effect of being able to use both
systems together to accomplish things that could not be achieved by either system
alone - for instance, greater continuity in tracking vehicles or persons in urban
areas.
Now, the technical compatibility and interoperability of these two GNSSes for
which the initial U.S.-EU agreement has laid the foundation will definitely bring
GPS and Galileo closer together. On the other hand, the differences between the
two complementary systems will tend to bring the GNSS world closer together.
By complementary, I mean the two systems are similar enough to be compatible,
but different enough to be useful. Separate GPS and Galileo signals, separate
ground and space infrastructures, separate operating entities, and separate
budgets. These things will build the global GNSS marketplace and user
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community faster than one system alone. That will occur as a result of the
increased redundancy, signal availability, robustness, and ultimately, user
confidence that result from having compatible but independent systems.
Not only will they be complementary systems, but they will also be two primary
systems - that is, each on its own will be capable of providing a complete
positioning and timing service. This simple and seemingly self-evident concept
has not fully taken root yet. A few years ago, about the time the European system
was designated Galileo, I was moderating a GNSS panel at a conference in
Toulouse, France - a center of the European space industry. An official from
EADS, one of the leading European defense and aerospace companies, made the
observation, "It will be desirable to have a back-up GNSS." And I said, "Yes,
GPS as a back-up to Galileo, right?" And the EADS official looked at me quite
blankly, because he had meant the opposite. At the time, part of the argument for
building Galileo was that it would provide a back-up for GPS in case the U.S.
system experienced a failure. That rationale and the fact that GPS came first and
had been an operational system for many years has created the sense of its
primacy - even among public and private advocates for Galileo. That unspoken
attitude still persists in some quarters, and probably will persist until an
operational Galileo system has achieved true parity - or even a superior position with GPS. At which point, either system will serve as a back-up - as well as a
complement - for the other.
In addition to these benefits, Galileo will help keep the United States honest in its
management of GPS. Not that I think the U.S. government has been noticeably
dishonest or narrowly manipulative in this matter. Quite the contrary, the United
States has been remarkably open-handed in ensuring access to GPS by users
around the world. In fact, the rapid adoption and spread of GPS technology and
applications could not possibly have taken place the way it did without that
policy. And it is a precedent that I believe Galileo's leaders would benefit from
considering further.
Over the years, the United States has been criticized for many things regarding its
GPS policies and management. But one thing that it did get right - perhaps in
large part accidentally and almost unwittingly - was to make the civil signal open
and free to users around the world.
Nonetheless, unilateral control, like unilateral policy-making, of such a potent
global utility is an invitation to complacence and unresponsiveness by the system
operator. Monopolies also tend to pose threats to technological innovation and
economic progress.
To this end, the mere discussion of a European system has already benefited
GNSS users, and Galileo's implementation will extend those benefits. I believe
the prospect of Galileo contributed to the urgency to craft the first comprehensive
U.S. presidential policy on GPS in 1996, to eliminate selective availability in May

https://ohioopen.library.ohio.edu/spacejournal/vol5/iss9/28

4

Gibbons: GPS & Galileo: Prospects for Building the Next Generation of Glob

2000, and to modernize the Block IIR generation of satellites. I believe that
approval of Galileo's implementation by the European heads of state and
authorization of public funding will help keep GPS modernization, including the
GPS III program, on track. Completion of Galileo within the near term will
definitely accelerate growth in GNSS product and service markets, as well as
drive new applications. It could also encourage the United States to change its
launch policy from launch-on-need, that is, replacing satellites only as they fail.
This launch-on-need policy means that many critical innovations in GPS signal
and system design have to wait until after launch of all the unused satellites with
an earlier technology that has been outstripped by technical advances. Successful
completion of a Galileo constellation with new signals and higher power could
encourage GPS' managers to launch on a planned schedule to more quickly install
a new operational capability with the modernized GPS signals and satellites.
So, all this comes as good news for GNSS equipment manufacturers and users
around the world. But many objectives must still be achieved and many obstacles,
avoided, before compatible, interoperable GNSS becomes a reality. An example
of the kinds of things that can derail this process can be seen in a recent article in
a British newspaper. The article described an exchange between U.S. and
European officials attending a conference on military space relations that led to
one U.S. delegate suggesting that the United States would attack Galileo satellites
if they continued transmitting signals that might be used by adversaries in a
theater of conflict.
Now, I would not invest this anecdote with too much weight or power - even if it
is completely true, even if these comments were actually made. I believe that they
represent more an expression of anxiety than of intention. Indeed, I think that we
should all share the anxiety of misuse of GNSS, whether GPS or Galileo. But, as I
understand the NAVWAR (navigation warfare) scenarios, capabilities, and
solutions developed by the U.S. Defense Department, the primary means to
prevent hostile use of GNSS will be much more benign, limited in scope and
targeted against the perpetrators and not GNSS system operators. And between
any GNSS-related crisis and an assault on Galileo satellites or infrastructure
stands the agreement signed in June, which established the official channel for
relations between the European Union and the United States in GNSS matters.
Let's turn briefly to the new U.S. presidential policy on GPS issued December 8,
2005. What the policy actually addresses is the broader term of space-based
positioning, navigation, and time or PNT, but for all practical purposes, it refers to
GPS and its augmentations.
Let me mention five specific themes in this new space-based PNT policy that
have a bearing on the issue of an interoperable GNSS.
First, the policy elevates the level of coordination of GPS policy and
management. It replaces the Interagency GPS Executive Board established under
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President Clinton's GPS policy directive in 1996 with a National Space-Based
Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Executive Committee. The new group will
be cochaired by deputy sectaries of defense and transportation. The former body
had been headed by lower ranking officials.
Second, the policy reaffirmed the free, open use of current and future civil GPS
signals as well as the free availability of technical specifications for the system.
These specifications enable manufacturers to design and build GPS receiver
equipment. They can be found in the GPS Interface Control Document or ICD.
Third, the policy directs the new PNT Executive Committee to oversee creation of
a five-year plan that provides for cost-sharing among federal agencies that
represent civil user communities. The plan must also address the need for further
augmentation systems for space-based PNT and for any unique or accelerated
PNT capabilities.
Fourth, the new policy spends a great deal of time addressing security-related
needs and issues. That should not be surprising, because we are living in a very
different world than the one in which the 1996 policy was created. The PNT
policy process was overseen by the National Security Council rather than the
White House Office on Science and Technology Policy, which directed the first
effort on GPS. The Bush policy identifies GPS - or PNT - as a component in
critical U.S. infrastructures, such as transportation and telecommunications.
The new directive issues a long series of mandates to the secretaries of defense
and homeland security to increase the nation's capability to anticipate, protect
against, and detect interference, attacks, or hostile exploitation of GPS. It even
discusses the potential need to deny hostile use of space-based PNT within the
United States, and calls for provision of back-up systems to take over PNT
functions in the extremely unlikely case that space-based systems become
temporarily unavailable.
Finally, the policy directive - both implicitly and explicitly - has the goal of
maintaining U.S. primacy in GNSS affairs. It speaks of GPS remaining "the preeminent military space-based PNT service." It calls for ensuring civil PNT
services "that exceed or are competitive" with foreign systems." And it seeks to
promote U.S. technological leadership in applications involving space-based
positioning, navigation, and timing.
Unfortunately, one of the things that the document does not address very
substantially is the relationship between GPS and other GNSS systems. Despite
last June's agreement with the European Union on GPS/Galileo cooperation, it
does not mention Galileo by name. The directive does mention the goal of seeking
to ensure that foreign space-based positioning, navigation, and timing systems are
interoperable with the civil services of the Global Positioning System and to
address mutual security concerns with foreign PNT providers to prevent hostile
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use of space-based positioning, navigation, and timing service. It gives the PNT
Executive Committee the responsibility for relationships with foreign positioning,
navigation, and timing services. But nowhere does the policy document provide
an enabling directive to implement the goal of compatible, interoperable global
navigation satellite systems.
So, what are some of the things that need to be done to continue the auspicious
beginning on GPS and Galileo cooperation? Well, here a few suggestions:
•

•

•

•

Establishing a permanent mechanism for regular political consultations on the
GNSS agenda, which must inevitably evolve as the systems mature and
modernize.
Cooperation in system operations and open formal lines of communications,
24/7, between GPS and Galileo controllers - whether that's a black box or a red
telephone, or even an exchange of liaison officers in master control stations.
A further agreement on security-related matters that sketches out the
appropriate actions for possible threat scenarios. That could even include
creation of a joint security board for assessing threats against either system,
evaluating situations that might require jamming or degradation of civil signals,
and recommending appropriate courses of action. Of course, actual events
rarely take the exact form or follow the exact course anticipated by contingency
plans. But forward-looking conventions would increase the state of readiness,
the familiarity of GNSS operators and officials with their counterparts, and the
capacity for responding to threat situations in whatever form they may arise.

Clear statements on the reciprocal role that industrial partners from the
United States and Europe can have in building and operating the other's
GNSS. The Boeing Company has included Alenia Spazio and Alcatel
Space on its GPS III team, EADS-Astrium is working with Boeing in
GPS/Galileo matters, and the iNavsat consortium has done the same with
Lockheed Martin, SiRF Technology, and NavTeq in its efforts to secure
the Galileo concession.

But more needs to be done. The Galileo Joint Undertaking, the Galileo
Supervisory Authority, or, if necessary, the European Council of Transport
Ministers should provide a clear statement on status, ownership, and
access to the Galileo equivalent of the GPS Interface Control Document
(ICD). The GPS ICD provides complete technical specifications that
enable manufacturers to build GPS equipment.
The two sides should also clarify the rules for U.S. companies'
participation in building, maintaining, and operating Galileo. At the same
time, the United States should clarify its guidelines on the export of
GNSS-related technologies and the allowable scope for European
industrial participation in the GPS III program.
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•

Agreements on carriage requirements for airplanes and commercial vessels that
minimize the financial burdens on the transport companies and maximizes the
use of combined GPS/Galileo equipment.

In closing, I'd like to end with a small warning. You often hear people say that the
uses of GPS are limited only by the human imagination. I've used the expression
myself. It has a wonderful gee-whiz quality to it: Limited only by the human
imagination. And with a second, interoperable GNSS, I guess that, what, the
human imagination will get twice as big, or GNSS innovations will take place
twice as fast, or something like that?
But I had an experience a few months ago as led me to think about that idea a
little more closely: While attending a conference in Sydney, Australia, l visited
the Royal Botanical Gardens. One of the many amazing facts that I learned there
is that the world contains 80,000 species of edible plants. However, only 20
species comprise 90 percent of the food actually eaten by the world's population things like corn, wheat, and rice. So, before we start feeling too smug about the
prospects of GNSS, and assuming that a second system is going to make things
twice as good, I think we need to recall our track record with the human diet.
Only implementing 20 out 80,000 options isn't so hot, and we need to do better
with GNSS. And that will take not merely imagination, but hard work, good
intentions, and sustained effort.
GPS and Galileo represent very different ways of achieving the same ends. It's a
little like the differences among faith traditions that are so troubling the world
today. The religious supremacists argue, sometimes violently, that their tradition
is the only way. But a modern sensibility suggests that faith - while each can be
primary and unique for its followers - should not be considered exclusive. We
should let every person find his or her own way to the heavens - whether in
matters of faith or of GNSS.

https://ohioopen.library.ohio.edu/spacejournal/vol5/iss9/28

8

